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In a rapidly evolving world, the U.S. Navy must build an affordable, 
sustainable fleet of surface combatants that is capable of keeping pace with any 
threat. This can only be accomplished with a highly sophisticated fleet of 
reconfigurable vessels capable of meeting their service-life expectancy of 40 
years. Modular Adaptable Ship (MAS) designs that include flexibility, decoupled 
payloads from the platform, standard interfaces, planned access routes, and 
growth margin for future technological advances present a viable option for the 
U.S. Navy. If the design approach to future surface combatants incorporates the 
use of Real Options Valuation (ROV) within the Integrated Risk Management 
(IRM) framework to account for unknown risk at the time of design, a reasonable 
portfolio of design options can be presented throughout the various stages of 
production. From our examination of the use of modular payloads on the 
Freedom (LCS-1) and Independence (LCS-2) classes and the planned access 
routes and growth margin for modernization on the San Antonio (LPD-17) class, 
a strong case can be made that a surface combatant designed with flexibility and 
adaptability would afford benefits, ultimately, to all entities within the Department 
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Seventy percent of the world is covered by water. To ensure freedom of 
navigation, economic independence, and national sovereignty, countries must 
maintain a highly efficient and technologically advanced fleet. With shrinking 
defense budgets, the current trend is to build fewer warships but maintain the 
same operational tempo. To continually meet the demands of a larger 
operational fleet, these new smaller fleets must be built on flexible and adaptable 
platforms with decoupled payloads that allow the vessels to accomplish a 
multitude of mission sets. Dr. Norbert Doerry from Naval Sea Systems Command 
has indicated that this type of modular design and build “offers an opportunity for 
a ship to affordably transform its mission systems over its service life to maintain 
military relevance” (Doerry, 2012, p.126). The design characteristics that allow 
these fleets to flourish are Modular Adaptable Ships (MAS) and Flexible and 
Adaptable Ship Options (FASO) (Mun & Housel, in press). MAS and FASO 
incorporated designs provide an economical platform for a seagoing navy to build 
highly effective warships capable of performing various missions in a multitude of 
environments.  
Flexible and adaptable ship designs are centered on a standard hull with 
modular mission payloads that offer a wide mission set, affordable scalability, 
reduced operational downtime, increased availability of the ship, and a reduced 
total number of mission modules for the fleet (Thorsteinson, 2013). For navies 
with limited budgets, having a flexible and modular platform allows a vessel to 
perform at times like a frigate and other times like a corvette (Paris, Brussels, & 
Fiorenza, 2013). These new fleets of multi-mission vessels are already 
operational in blue water fleets around the world operated by countries including 
Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Australia, and the United States.  
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Modular build and design has been in use since the mid-twentieth century. 
During World War II, Henry Kaiser’s shipyards were able to produce Liberty 
Ships in minimal time due in part to the heavy use of modular construction, and 
the Germans constructed their Type 21 Submarines with modular build principles 
(Abbott, Levine, & Vasilakos, 2008). Starting in 1979, the German shipyard 
Blohm & Voss began building modular corvettes and frigates for third-world 
navies using a modular concept known as Mehrzweck-Kombination (MEKO). 
Shipbuilders ThyseenKrupp (2017) capitalized on the MEKO concept and though 
mature evolution, has produced the MEKO A-100, A-200, and now the MEKO A-
400. In 1986, the Royal Danish Navy (RDN) began implementation of a modular 
concept called STANFLEX for a new class of patrol craft known as the 
Flyvefisken (SF 300) class (Abbott et al., 2008). The specific use of modular 
mission payload within the SF 300s directly translated into the future design and 
development of the RDN Absalon support ships and Iver Huitfeldt class frigates. 
The French and Italians have worked together to design a flexible multi-mission 
frigate known as the Frégate Européenne Multi-Mission (FREMM) class, while 
the Australian Royal Navy has the modular Anzac class of frigates and Hobart 
class of Air-Warfare Destroyers (AWD).  
The United States Navy began to look at modular builds in 1975 with the 
Sea Systems Modification and Modernization by Modularity (SEAMOD) program 
(Abbott et al., 2008). SEAMOD focused on decoupling “the development of the 
payload from the development of the platform” (Doerry, 2012, p.126). This 
uncoupling provided two major benefits: it allowed the payload to be developed in 
parallel with the platform vice in series, which allowed the most recent 
technological systems to be installed onboard at the time the ship was put to sea; 
and it permitted rapid removal, replacement, or installment of mission payloads, 
preventing extended maintenance yard periods (Abbott et al., 2008; Doerry, 2012). 
SEAMOD evolved into the Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) and is 
characterized by “modular design, key interfaces, and the use of open standards 
for key interfaces where appropriate” (Abbott et al., 2008). These efforts led to the 
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development of the Littoral Combat Ship (USS Freedom (LCS-1) and USS 
Independence (LCS-2)), DDG 1000, Landing Platform/Dock (USS San Antonio, 
LPD-17), and the Future Frigate for the U.S. Navy (Abbott et al., 2008).  
Glen Sturtevant, the Director for Science and Technology at PEO Ships—
NAVSEA 21, has indicated that if future surface combatants are going to achieve 
their expected service life, the design must be flexible and adaptable. He noted 
these new warships should be built with “payloads that decouple from the 
platform, be configured with standard interfaces for technical modules, 
reconfigure rapidly, be designed with planned access routes, and have 
allowances for future growth margin” (Sturtevant, 2017). Growth margins allow 
for future technologies to be rapidly implemented into the existing design, 
preventing the vessel from having to enter into an extended maintenance 
overhaul period. Growth margins work hand in hand with the parallel 
development of mature payloads, ensuring that the latest technology can be 
installed as it is developed because of the standard interfaces. Sturtevant (2017) 
cites some of the following benefits of a flexible and adaptable design: 
Separates payload development from the platform production; 
Increased competition and innovation; Cross-platform commonality; 
Rapid prototyping of payloads enables rapid acquisition of new 
capabilities; Efficient technology refresh and incremental upgrades; 
and paces the threat (Sturtevant, 2017) 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The problem is that traditional surface combatant designs leave little to no 
room for future growth or the ability to rapidly reconfigure as technology 
advances. This is a problem because payloads are installed as the ship is built, 
and too often the technology is obsolete by the time of commissioning. To reduce 
risk, typical surface combatant designs have altered either the hull and 
propulsion system but kept the same superstructure, or designed a new 
superstructure but left the hull untouched. For example, the DDG Flight III is built 
on the same hull as the DDG Flight IIA, but will incorporate a new superstructure 
to accommodate the Air and Missile Defense Radar, AN/SPY-6(V). Although this 
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model has served the U.S. Navy well, the DDG Flight III lacks any growth margin 
for future weapons upgrades and will require extensive yard periods and a midlife 
upgrade to remain relevant throughout the ship’s life cycle. With the rising costs 
of ship maintenance, and the pace at which technology advances, this model 
puts surface combatants in danger of not fulfilling service-life expectancy. Moving 
forward, the U.S. Navy must incorporate flexible and adaptable ship design into 
all future surface combatants to ensure mission relevancy, reduce maintenance 
costs and extended yard periods, and keep pace with technological advances.  
C. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
By incorporating Modular Adaptable Ship (MAS) technologies and Flexible 
and Adaptable Ship Options (FASO) into ship design, the Department of the 
Navy will develop a fleet capable of meeting multiple missions with a single 
platform. The purpose of this study is to determine which capabilities (payloads) 
should be included in the ship design, so that a thorough evaluation of the 
possible risks can be identified and evaluated. Real Options Valuation (ROV), 
Knowledge Value Added (KVA), and Integrated Risk Management (IRM) through 
the use of Monte Carlo Simulation can provide ship designers and strategic 
leaders with the information needed to make critical decisions with respect to 
uncertainty and risk within the ship design. The output of this kind of analysis is 
important because if the United States Navy is to remain the world’s preeminent 
sea power, we must find the best way to ensure that ship design will be flexible 
and adaptable. 
By examining foreign navies that currently employ payload and combat 
system modularity, the U.S. Navy can make informed design decisions for future 
surface combatants. To develop a proof of concept methodology, this study used 
the Integrated Risk Management (IRM) framework to explore the benefits and 
risks of using a flexible ship design within the context of two case examples: 
weapon modularity on the Littoral Combat Ship (USS Freedom [LCS-1] and USS 
Independence [LCS-2]); and growth margin for future weapons capability and 
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technology upgrades on the new class of Landing Platform/dock (USS San 
Antonio [LPD-17]). 
D. HYPOTHESES 
This thesis addressed the following hypotheses: 
 H0:  Flexible and Adaptable ships are not able to maintain 
relevancy, rapidly reconfigure, or evolve during the course of their 
service-life expectancy. 
 H1:  Flexible and Adaptable ships are able to maintain relevancy, 
rapidly reconfigure, and evolve during the course of their service-
life expectancy. 
 H0:  There is no advantage to building surface combatants with 
modular payloads developed in parallel to the platform compared 
with the current nonmodular shipbuilding approach. 
 H1:  There is an advantage to building surface combatants with 
modular payloads developed in parallel to the platform compared 
with the current nonmodular shipbuilding approach. 
 H0: There is no future cost savings advantage to building a 
surface combatant with growth margin for weapons and technology 
upgrades over the life cycle of a surface combatant. 
 H1: There is a future cost savings advantage to building a 
surface combatant with growth margin for weapons and technology 
upgrades over the life cycle of a surface combatant. 
E. RESEARCH APPROACH 
This thesis examined the effects of a modular approach to designing and 
building flexible and adaptable ships on cost and value by looking at two case 
studies. Case Study 1 examined the cost- and time-saving benefits of designing 
a surface combatant with weapons modules as compared to a structurally 
integral weapons payload. The original missile module for LCS was the U.S. 
Army’s XM-501 Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS). When the program was canceled in 
2010, LCS was left without a missile module. The benefit of a modular design 
allowed LCS to continue production while an alternate missile module was 
developed in parallel.  
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Case Study 2 examined the long-term cost-saving benefits of having 
reserved weight and space for the future installation of the MK-41 VLS on the 
San Antonio class (LPD-17). LPD-17 through LPD-27 have trunk access and 
cooling requirements already in place for future installation, whereas LPD-28 will 
have weight and space reserved for VLS but will not install integration 
capabilities during production. Additionally, Case Study 2 reviewed the benefits 
of having designed one large main passageway that allows for ease of 
maintenance, troop movements, and technological upgrades.  
F. THESIS STRUCTURE 
Chapter II focuses on the current status of the Danish, German, French, 
Italian, Australian, and American navies with regards to their fleets of modular, 
flexible, and adaptable ships. The Danish, German, French, Italian, and 
Australian navies are constrained by smaller defense budgets and produce 
significantly smaller surface combatant fleets in comparison to the United States. 
By building modular and flexible vessels, these countries have been able to 
sustain operations in blue waters around the world with sophisticated and 
technologically advanced platforms that are capable of evolving with the threat 
with a smaller number of vessels. Cross-platform commonality with respect to 
weapons modules and the ability to rapidly change mission are essential design 
elements for these navies. Additionally, these navies recognize the advantage to 
leaving growth margin to rapidly integrate new technology as it becomes 
available.  
Chapter III highlights the current problems within the U.S. Navy’s 
approach to ship design of surface combatants. With current platforms losing 10–
15 years of their service-life expectancy and incurring rising maintenance costs, 
the U.S. Navy needs to look at other ship design models. One alternative design 
model incorporates the use of modularity and flexibility to ensure surface 
combatants can maintain combat relevancy throughout their life cycle. A modular 
and flexible design reduces extended yard periods, allows for rapid 
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reconfiguration, and creates an environment where technology is produced in 
parallel with the platform.  
Chapter IV discusses Case Study 1 and highlights the benefits of 
decoupled payloads. The fleet of Littoral Combat Ships has been operational 
since 2010, despite lacking a missile module to complement its Anti-Surface 
Mission Package. The advantage to having designed the surface combatant with 
modular payloads versus a structurally integral missile system allowed LCS to 
continue in production while the module was developed in parallel. With a 
modular missile payload, LCS was able to avoid an extensive yard period that 
would have been incurred if the missile had been structurally integral to the 
platform. Through the use of standard interfaces, a new missile module for LCS 
has been achieved with little to no added cost burden to overall life-cycle 
maintenance sustainment costs. 
Chapter V discusses Case Study 2 and illustrates the need to reserve 
weight and space for payloads not installed at time of production. The 12 Landing 
Platform/dock vessels in the LPD-17 San Antonio class “were a functional 
replacement for four classes of amphibious ships: LPD 4s, LSTs, LKAs, and LSD 
36s” (Jane’s IHS Markit, 2017b). With the ability to install the MK-41 Vertical 
Launch System (VLS) at a later time, the San Antonio class can evolve with the 
threat and ultimately act as a stand-alone platform if needed. Additionally, the 
San Antonio class was built with a large main passageway to facilitate the ease 
of maintenance, movement of troops, and the installation and replacement of 
server racks. This design aspect is a fundamental feature in a modular and 
flexible design that facilitates rapid technological advances. 
Finally, Chapter VI includes recommendations for the design of future 
modular, flexible, and adaptable surface combatants with a strong emphasis on 
the need to reserve weight and space for future growth and technological 
advances. Additionally, Chapter VI looked at other areas within the Department 
of Defense where modularity and flexible and adaptable design could have future 
cost-savings impact.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When the U.S. Navy invests in the design and production of a fleet of 
surface combatants, there is an expectation that a vessel will remain combat 
relevant over its 40-year service life. According to Doerry (2012), U.S. surface 
combatants are currently falling short of their life-cycle expectancy by 10–15 
years (Doerry, 2012). To ensure long-term combat relevancy, a surface 
combatant must be able to evolve with the threat and keep pace with 
technological advances. By examining the different modular designs currently in 
use by foreign navies, the U.S. Navy can capitalize on decades of successful 
flexible and adaptable ship design. Adopting a new approach towards the design 
of future surface combatants that heavily incorporates the use of modularity and 
standard interfaces to create a flexible and adaptable platform will allow the U.S. 
Navy to continuously evolve and keep pace with current threats. 
B. FLEXIBLE AND ADAPTABLE SHIP DESIGN 
Over the past 40 years, foreign navies have made continuous strides 
towards building and designing sophisticated, sustainable, and capable surface 
combatants. With smaller defense budgets in comparison to the United States, 
and constrained by high labor costs, foreign navies rely on ship designs that 
incorporate modularity, flexibility, and adaptability. These ship designs focus 
heavily on a standard hull with the same machines (propulsion), but offer a 
variety of modular payloads for specific mission sets. Decoupled payloads that 
integrate into combat management systems through standard interfaces allow 
these navies to swap out mission modules in a short period of time. With proven 
capabilities, these navies are deploying worldwide in support of ongoing 
initiatives to ensure freedom of navigation. Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, 
and Australia have proven fleets that incorporate modularity as a core 
component of ship design. For the U.S. Navy, the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 
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was a new design approach. Designed with three weapons modules that support 
different mission packages, it was the first surface combatant class of flexible 
and adaptable ships for the U.S. Although it failed to meet all of its modularity 
milestones at the time of production, LCS still deployed and met operational 
needs while payload development continued in parallel. 
C. ROYAL DANISH NAVY 
The Royal Danish Navy (RDN) has been at the forefront of modular ship 
design since 1987 when the first of 14 Flyvefisken class, or STANFLEX 300 (SF 
300), multi-role vessels (MRVs) were commissioned. Naval Technology (2017c) 
found that the design was based on a standard hull that used modular bays to 
change mission type through use of the Standard Flex (STANFLEX) concept, 
and the fleet was ultimately decommissioned in October 2010 (Naval 
Technology, 2017c). The use of the Standard Flex concept played a fundamental 
role in the design and development of the larger follow-on modular designs seen 
in the Absalon Class Littoral Support Ships and Iver Huitfeldt class frigates.  
1. Flyvefisken Class (SF 300) 
The inception of the Flyvefisken Class and Standard Flex began as a 
feasibility study in 1982 (Global Security, 2017a). The Royal Danish Navy wanted 
to replace its fleet of 24 mission-specific ships (8 Fast Attack Craft (FAC), 8 
patrol boats, and 8 mine countermeasure vessels) with 14 multi-role vessels 
(MRVs) and commissioned the SF 300 fleet between 1987 and1996 (Global 
Security, 2017a). To meet the multi-role vessel mission, the SF 300 was built on 
a standard hull of nonmagnetic fiberglass reinforced plastic (FRP) that measured 
54m in length and 9m in beam, with a crew that varied between 19 and 29 
personnel depending on mission type and overall tonnage ranging between 320 
and 485 tons specific to payload installed (Global Security, 2017a).  
STANFLEX design capitalized on mission modularity by incorporating four 
interchangeable mission containers, one forward and three aft (Naval 
Technology, 2017c). The stainless steel containers measured 3m by 3.5m by 
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2.5m and housed all dedicated machinery and electronic payloads connected by 
a standard interface panel (Naval Technology, 2017c). “Each of these units can 
be (re)configured at a short notice for different roles, simply by installing the right 
combination of standard-size equipment containers in the four positions” (Global 
Security, 2017a). The ability to quickly and efficiently swap payload allowed 
these MRVs to serve the following mission sets: anti-air defense (AAW); anti-
surface warfare (ASuW); anti-submarine warfare (ASW); electronic warfare (EW); 
mine countermeasures (MCM); patrol and surveillance; and pollution control 
(Global Security, 2017a).  
The use of containerized weapon systems permitted the SF 300 to have 
an open architecture C4I system that allowed “new weapons systems to be 
added by creating new nodes” (Naval Technology, 2017c). Major technological 
upgrades were not required for the ship itself, but merely applied to the 
appropriate container. Global Security (2017a) stated that containers could be 
swapped out in 30–60 minutes pier-side using standard civilian cranes facilitating 
rapid mission change if necessary (Global Security, 2017a). Ultimately, 15 
different mission modules were developed for the SF 300, which included 
weaponized containers for the Mk48 NATO Vertical Launch Sea Sparrow surface 
to air missile, Boeing’s Harpoon Block II surface-to-surface missile, and the 
76mm Oto Melara Super Rapid gun (Naval Technology, 2017c).  
The Flyvefisken Class demonstrated that a smaller number of multi-role 
vessels were capable of meeting the same mission demands of a fleet almost 
twice its size. STANFLEX and modular payload allowed for containers to be pre-
staged for mission flex while simultaneously reducing downtime for upgrades. 
The success of the SF 300 fleet was the cornerstone for the RDN’s development 
of the Absalon Littoral Combat Ship.  
2. Absalon Class Support Ships 
The success of STANFLEX propelled the Royal Danish Navy to continue 
to design seagoing naval vessels with modularity as the core requirement. 
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Lundquist (2012) stated the Flyvefisken class was a coastal platform capable of 
performing a mission set designed to protect local waters, but it lacked the 
endurance to deploy to the Gulf of Aden or the Persian Gulf (Lundquist, 2012). 
The Flyvefisken Class served the RDN from the mid-1980s through the early 
2000s, but left the Danish lacking a true blue water navy. With a firm commitment 
to NATO’s Ocean Shield mission to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa 
(Lundquist, 2012), a need arose for a bigger platform capable of reaching distant 
locations like Somalia. 
To meet the rising need for a blue water navy, the RDN commissioned two 
flexible support ships, HDMS Absalon in 2004 and HDMS Esbern Snare in 2005. 
Capitalizing on the success of the STANFLEX design and the use of payload 
modularity, the Absalon class was designed with the same containerized weapon 
packages as the SF 300 but also featured “significant internal volume inside the 
multipurpose flexible support deck (FSD) to support stern ramps for vehicles and 
boats” (Lundquist, 2012). The ability to launch and recover small boats or 
vehicles in conjunction with containerized weapon systems allowed the Absalon 
to float between two classes of warship: amphibious and combatant (Lundquist, 
2012). Under the various configurations, the Absalon class could be “equipped 
for naval warfare, land attack, strategic seal missions, emergency disaster relief 
or as a hospital ship” (Naval Technology, 2017a).  
The Absalon class was built on a frigate hull and measures a little more 
than two-and-a-half times the length of the Flyvefisken Class at 137m with a 
beam of 19.5m (Naval Technology, 2017a). Total tonnage is between 4,500 tons 
and 6,300 tons, depending on configuration (Global Security, 2017b). “The ship 
design, with 16 watertight sections or compartments and two airtight bulkheads, 
incorporates survivability and damage limitation including dual redundancy, 
automated damage control zones, damage detectors and smoke zones” (Naval 
Technology, 2017a). Focusing on long-term cost savings based on crew 
requirements, the Absalon class was outfitted with a maximum crew of 100, 
could accommodate 70 additional personnel and house another 130 in temporary 
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container facilities on the flexible support deck (Global Security, 2017b), and has 
personnel facilities and a galley for up to 300 embarked crew (Naval Technology, 
2017a).  
The Absalon class features five STANFELX container wells located 
amidships on the weapons deck (Pike, 2016; Lundquist, 2012). As with the SF 
300, changing the combination of STANFLEX payloads allows the Absalon class 
to easily shift mission. Both Global Security and Naval Technology found that 
each of the five individual containers is capable of being loaded with either eight 
Boeing Harpoon Block II surface-to-surface missiles or 12 surface-to-air RIM-162 
Raytheon Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) (Global Security, 2017b; Naval 
Technology, 2017a). Additionally, the Absalon container wells are configured to 
handle “any combination of STANFLEX weapon/container suites developed for 
the Flyvefisken class” (Global Security, 2017b). By re-using existing containers 
and ensuring compatibility, the Absalon class created greater flexibility for 
mission type while proving to be a cost savings. 
The modularity of the payload in conjunction with the flexible deck have 
allowed the Absalon class to be at the forefront of flexible and adaptable warship 
design. According to Naval Technology (2017a), the flexible support deck is 90m 
long, with 250m of parking lanes, and encompasses 915m2 of total usable space 
(Naval Technology, 2017a). The FSD is designed for roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) 
vehicles and the reinforced deck “can embark vehicles up to 62t such as the 
Leopard II Main Battle Tank” (Naval Technology, 2017a). The flexible multi-
purpose deck can take 
75% of an Army reconnaissance battalion, a containerized hospital 
with 40 beds and a capacity for 10 surgeries a day, a containerized 
command module for a staff of up to 70 personnel, a container 
accommodation for emergency evacuations, up to 300 mines in 
modular rails…or facilities for carrying two high-speed insertion 
craft Swedish Type SRC-90E at 7.4t each. (Global Security, 2017b) 
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The ability of the FSD to rapidly reconfigure missions based on the use of 
containers has allowed the Absalon class to effectively and efficiently meet all of 
its desired mission types.  
Modularity with the Absalon class is not limited to containerized weapons 
and the flexible support decks. The Combat Information Center (CIC) has a 
Terma C-Flex combat management system and “virtually any console in CIC can 
be used interchangeably with the exception of the gun-firing console and 
Harpoon Block II consoles” (Lundquist, 2012). Finally, the flight deck is equipped 
with a hangar for two helicopters, rated at 20t, and when not in use for helicopter 
operation, it can store and stack cargo containers (Lundquist, 2012). The 
Absalon class demonstrated that modularity could be applied to larger combatant 
ships, and was not localized to smaller littoral ships. Continuing to capitalize on 
the growing success of its modular techniques, the RDN moved forward with 
designing and building a flexible and adaptable frigate fleet. 
3. Iver Huitfeldt Frigates 
The success of the Absalon class laid the keel for the Iver Huitfeldt Class 
Frigates, which comprises three operational frigates: Iver Huitfeldt (F361), Peter 
Willemoes (F362), and Niels Juel (F363). As Lundquist (2013) noted, the 
complement of the Absalon and Huitfeldt class added a true combatant element 
to an already formidable class of flexible support ships, providing the opportunity 
for the Royal Danish Navy to assume a more global blue water posture with 
extended deployments farther from native waters (Lundquist, 2013).  
The Huitfeldt class was designed and built on the same hull used for the 
Absalon class creating an 80 percent shared commonality between the two 
classes (Lundquist, 2013). The Huitfeldt class is 138.7m in length with a beam of 
19.75m, carries a crew of 101, and has accommodations for 165. (Lundquist, 
2013). Where the Huitfeldt class lacks the flexible support deck found on the 
Absalon class, it has a more sophisticated AAW capability and quieter acoustic 
signature for ASW operations, and is twice as powerful (Lundquist, 2013).  
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The Huitfeldt class was built without the flexible support deck to 
accommodate the addition of the MK41 32-cell Vertical Launch System (VLS), 
which is capable of launching the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2), SM-6, as well as 
the RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) (Naval Technology, 2017e). 
Lundquist (2013) noted that in addition to the VLS, the Huitfeldt class continued 
with the modular mission payload design. He found that the Huitfeldt class has 
six slots for weaponized containers that can be loaded with additional ESSMs or 
Harpoon Block II missiles. He pointed out that the frigates capitalized on the 
reuse of design elements, and the stainless steel containers used on the Huitfeldt 
are the same containers used on Absalon: updated and modified containers from 
the cold-war era Flyvefisken class. He also noted that when a container is not 
being utilized, it can be stored, updated, or re-equipped. He concluded that by 
using a standardized interface, the weaponized containers represent flexibility 
and adaptability through their ability to plug and play on any Danish ship 
(Lundquist, 2013).  
The Combat Information Center (CIC) modeled the flexible support ships 
CIC and utilizes the same Terma C-Flex combat management system (CMS) 
(Lundquist, 2013). “Modularity and the COTS (commercial-off-the-shelf) -based 
system with an open architecture-approach (OA) makes these ships easy to 
modify and less time consuming to upgrade” (Lundquist, 2013). Upgrades to IT 
systems, weapons, communications, and sensors are done through rack 
replacement on the standard civilian 19-inch racks installed throughout the frigate 
(Lundquist, 2013). Through the use of IT modularity, the fleet of RDN frigates is 
capable of upgrading and installing technology faster and more efficiently. 
The Iver Huitfeldt class of frigates represents maturity in Danish modular 
ship design. Powerful and sophisticated, the frigate was built for $325 million 
(Cavas, 2014), about one third of the cost of a U.S. Arleigh Burke Flight III class 
destroyer (USGAO, 2016). Cmdr. Senior Grade Hesselberg, who is in charge of 
the Danish frigate program, stated: 
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We have built in flexibility from the beginning. It’s not that much 
more expensive in the beginning, but easier to update later on. It’s 
the safe, low-risk option. We learned from our flexible support ships 
to have extra space for containers on the frigates. Modularity 
makes ships easier and more economical to build. It also makes 
them more efficient to operate, less expensive to maintain and to 
modernize. (Lundquist, 2013) 
For the last 30 years, the Royal Danish Navy has significantly reduced the size of 
its fleet and replaced it with a smaller, powerful, cost-effective fleet. The RDN has 
proven that flexible and adaptable ships with modular payloads can accomplish a 
multitude of missions and play a significant role in international waters.  
D. GERMAN NAVY 
At the forefront of modular design for the German Navy was the German 
shipbuilder Blohm + Voss. The Blohm + Voss design concept known as 
Mehrzweck-Kombination (MEKO), which translates as “multi-purpose 
combination,” has been utilized in ship construction and design since the 1970s. 
According to Kamerman (2015), the success of the MEKO class can be seen in 
13 navies worldwide in various corvettes and frigates (Kamerman, 2015). 
Shipbuilders ThyssenKrupp (2017) have capitalized on the MEKO design, and 
stated that modular mission payloads in 20ft standardized ISO containers create 
adaptability and flexibility and allow navies to rapidly reconfigure mission type 
based on operational needs. The shipbuilders pointed out that modules can be 
rotated for upgrades, maintenance or between ships, which reduces the number 
of overall payloads required for the fleet. The company noted that this simple 
reduction results in significant cost savings in procurement and maintenance 
over the life cycle of the ship. The MEKO class comprises the MEKO A-100 
Corvette and the MEKO A-200 Frigate and is the backbone for the new German 
frigate class, the Baden-Württemberg (F125) (ThyssenKrupp, 2017). 
Kamerman (2015) stated the German Navy will acquire four Baden-
Württemberg class frigates to replace the eight frigates in the Bremen class 
(F122) commissioned in the 1980s. He found that the Baden-Württemberg frigate 
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design incorporated enhanced survivability capabilities to include floating, 
moving, and fighting after sustaining damage; the ability to embark and deploy 
Special Forces; maintaining prolonged periods at sea with little maintenance; and 
modular mission capabilities (Kamerman, 2015). The F125 is a new hull design 
drawing from the MEKO A-200 and the German F124, measures 149.5m in 
length with a beam of 18.8m, displaces 7,300 tons at full load, and will carry a 
crew between 105 and 120, but can accommodate up to 190 personnel to 
include a 20-person aircraft detachment and 50 embarked forces (Jane’s IHS 
Markit, 2017a). The first frigate, Baden-Württemberg (F222) will be 
commissioned in 2017, Nordrhein-Westfalen (F223) in 2018, Sachsen-Anhalt 
(F224) in 2019, and Rheinland-Pfalz (F225) in 2020 (Pape, 2016). 
Kamerman (2015) stated the F125 class is designed to experience 
prolonged deployment periods of 24 months and increased yearly hours of 
operation of 5,000h/yr. He found that this extended availability will be 
accomplished through a two-crew concept with crews swapping every 4 months 
in the given operational theater. He noted that through modernization, 
automation, and cross-rate training, the crew of the F125 is approximately half 
the size of the marginally smaller German Sachsen (F124) class frigates that 
currently deploy for six-month cycles and operate 2,500h/yr. The design flexibility 
of the F125 will double the availability of the current German frigate fleet while 
simultaneously reducing overhead (Kamerman, 2015). 
The F125 will take advantage of MEKO technology. MEKO designs rely 
heavily on modularity, which increases the speed at which the ship can be built 
and facilitates faster upgrades and refits. According to Kamerman (2015), the 
F125 will feature weapon modules, electronic modules, mast modules, and a 
modular combat system with standard interfaces. He found that given the 
flexibility in the design, the F125 readily translates into an exportable frigate 
design within the MEKO family: the MEKO A-400 Generic Evolved MOTs Multi-
Role Frigate. The MEKO A-400 will be built on the same class-standard hull with 
the same machinery as the F125 frigate, but offers foreign navies the flexibility to 
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specify any combination of combat systems from any supplier resulting in more 
than 80 percent commonality between the two classes of ships (Kamerman, 
2015). This commonality creates a larger fleet of ships from which to draw 
resources, technical knowledge, and maintenance upgrades.  
E. FRENCH NAVY  
Similar to the Royal Danish Navy, the French Navy has made substantial 
strides over the last decade to replace three separate aging fleets with two 
smaller, state-of-the-art, flexible and adaptable fleets of frigates. Naval 
Technology (2017d) stated the Frégate Européenne Multi-Mission (FREMM) was 
a joint venture between the Italian and French navies, built and designed by the 
Direction des Constructions Navales Services (French naval defense company) 
(DCNS) and Orizzonte Sistemi Navali with Fincatieri and Finmeccania (Naval 
Technology, 2017d). These highly modular frigate designs allowed the French, 
Italians, and potential international clients a choice of equipment with regards to 
weapons and combat systems (Cavas & Tran, 2016). The newer Frégate de 
Taille Intermédiaire (FTI), specific to the French Navy, was unveiled in October 
2016 (Peruzzi, Scott, & Pape, 2016). Designed by DCNS, it promotes modular 
design with potential international appeal (Cavas & Tran, 2016). 
1. Aquitaine Class 
Naval Technology (2017d) stated that the Aquitaine Class is comprised of 
FREMM frigates and will replace the nine D’Estienne d’Orves class avisos (A69 
Type Aviso) and nine Tourville and Georges Legues class anti-submarine 
frigates (Naval Technology, 2017d). The modular design of the FREMM vessels 
allowed the French Navy to choose between two mission versions: a land attack 
version with torpedoes, vertical launch system, and cruise missiles; or an anti-
submarine (ASW) version fitted with torpedoes, vertical launch system, and an 
active towed array sonar (Naval Technology, 2017d). Tomkins (2016) stated the 
French government originally committed to 17 FREMMs, but defense budget cuts 
reduced the class to 11 and then ultimately 8 vessels. He noted that the French 
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Navy has committed to building two FREMMs in the land attack configuration and 
six in the anti-submarine configuration. Aquitaine (D 650) was commissioned in 
November 2012, Provence (D 652) was commissioned in June 2015, and 
Languedoc (D 653) was commissioned in March 2016, each configured to ASW 
(Tomkins, 2016).  
The French FREMM is 142m in length, has a beam of 20m, displaces 
6,000 tons, and carries a crew of 108 (Naval Technology, 2017d). “The frigate’s 
layout has been designed to provide sufficient size for operational effectiveness, 
maintainability and sustained upgrades. The layout incorporates increased 
headroom between decks, deeper and longer engine compartments and larger 
equipment pathways for access and maintenance” (Naval Technology, 2017d). 
Both the land attack and anti-submarine versions of the Aquitaine class 
feature the MBDA Exocet MM40 Block III for anti-ship and littoral attack capability 
and the MBDA Aster 15 and Aster 30 for air defense (Naval Technology, 2017d). 
The land attack vessels will also be equipped with MDBA SCALP naval cruise 
missiles (Naval Technology, 2017d). Additionally, both versions of the frigate 
boast an aft helicopter hangar and deck encompassing 520m2, while the land 
attack frigates “are fitted for a tactical unmanned air vehicle and have the 
capability to control long-endurance, medium- and high-altitude unmanned air 
vehicles launched from ground sites or from other platforms” (Naval Technology, 
2017d). 
Similar to the Danish Absalon and Iver Huitfeldt classes, the Aquitaine 
class Combat Information Center (CIC) features a high-speed data network with 
an open architecture that will enable future weapon systems to be integrated into 
the frigates (Naval Technology, 2017d). With external communication equipment 
compliant with NATO standards, French FREMMs can operate on Link 11, Link 
16, Link 22, and a JSAT tactical data link (Naval Technology, 2017d). This 
international NATO co-operability has resulted in the Aquitaine and Provence 
participating in joint exercises with the U.S. Navy’s Task Force 50 in the Persian-
Arabian Gulf (Tomkins, 2016).  
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The design features of the FREMM have taken into account a flexible and 
adaptable modular build that allows for future growth in technology at a 
sustainable cost. Given choices between the various mission sets, growth 
margins for upgrades, and a relatively small and manageable crew size, FREMM 
is a viable option for a multitude of foreign navies.  
(1) Italian Bergamini Class 
Under the joint FREMM venture with the French, the Italian Navy has 
committed to the purchase of 10 frigates to replace the Lupo-and-Maestrale-
class frigates built in the 1970s by Fincantieri (Naval Today, 2016). Known as the 
Bergamini class, Carlo Bergamini and Virginio Fasan were delivered in 2013, 
Carlo Margottini in 2014, Carabinieri in 2015, and Alpino was commissioned in 
September 2016 (Naval Today, 2016). The Italian Navy expects to have all 10 
frigates delivered by 2020 and will operate four anti-submarine variants and six 
general purpose variants of the FREMM class (Naval Today, 2016).  
(2) Foreign FREMM sales 
Given the modular choices for combat systems and weapons, smaller 
crews, and the capability to carry out various mission types, the FREMM class is 
appealing to foreign navies. According to Tomkins (2016), both the Egyptian 
Navy and Royal Moroccan Navy each operate a FREMM ship in anti-submarine 
configuration but without a vertical launch system or jamming capabilities 
(Tomkins, 2016). Built by DCNS, FREMM Mohammed VI was delivered to 
Morocco in 2014, while FREMM Tahya Misr was delivered to the Egyptian Navy 
in 2015 (Naval Today, 2016). 
2. FTI Class 
The success of the FREMM class has pushed the French to continue to 
tailor their existing fleet into a smaller, highly effective combatant force. Peruzzi, 
Scott, & Pape (2016) noted that the Frégate de Taille Intermédiaire (FTI) is a 
medium-size frigate and will replace the five in-service La Fayette class frigates 
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starting in 2023 (Peruzzi, Scott, & Pape, 2016). “The 4,200-ton frigate is a fresh 
design, different from the preceding FREMM multi-mission frigates, and features 
an unusual ‘inverted bow’ intended to improve seakeeping in high sea states” 
(Cavas & Tran, 2016). The FTI will be a formidable platform capable of executing 
the following: 
Anti-submarine, anti-surface, and anti-air warfare capabilities, the 
ability to deploy Special Forces projections, capable of supporting 
operations against asymmetric threats, able to operate as a single 
vessel or as part of a joint national or combined international task 
force, provide power projection at distance, conduct maritime 
interdiction, crisis prevention, and intelligence gathering operations. 
(Peruzzi et al., 2016) 
According to Cavas & Tran (2016), the FTI will measure 122.25m in 
length, have a beam of 17.7m, and carry a crew of 125 personnel inclusive of a 
15-person aviation detachment, and can accommodate an additional 50 
personnel depending on the mission. The authors noted that each frigate will be 
equipped with two MBDA Aster 30 launchers, each comprising four cells as 
compared to the four launchers on the FREMM class. They also noted that FTI 
will be capable of launching the Aster, MM-40 Exocet Block III guided anti-ship 
missiles, and has a 76mm cannon. Finally, the authors pointed out that the 
compact frigate will reach speeds of 27 knots with an endurance of 5,000NM on 
a combined diesel and diesel (CODAD) engine arrangement. The compliment of 
the eight FREMM vessels (six anti-submarine configuration and two air defense 
configuration), five FTIs, and two Horizon class anti-air warfare frigates will make 
the French Navy a 15-strong frigate force by 2030 (Cavas & Tran, 2016).  
The FTI is estimated to cost $840 million, which is still 20–30 percent less 
than the 6,000 ton FREMM (Cavas & Tran, 2016). Despite this price tag, DCNS 
is committed to producing a flexible and adaptable frigate that delivers options to 
the buyer, be it the French Navy or the international naval community, and 
estimates it could possibly sell an additional 40 frigates of this design (Cavas & 
Tran, 2016). At the core of the FTI design are embedded evolutionary and 
adaptive capabilities based around a modular design (Peruzzi et al., 2016) that 
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offers freedom in a rapidly changing technical world for clients to pick and choose 
their combat systems and equipment (Cavas & Tran, 2016). 
F. ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY 
Currently, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) utilizes the Anzac class of 
frigates as its primary anti-submarine warfare platform. According to Naval 
Technology (2017b), the Anzac class was built by Tenix Defense Systems (now 
part of BAE Systems Australia), and eight were commissioned for the RAN 
between 1996 and 2006, and two were commissioned for the Royal New 
Zealand Navy in 1997 and 1999 (Naval Technology, 2017b). “Anzac frigates are 
long-range escorts with roles that include air defense, anti-submarine warfare 
and surveillance” (Kerr, 2017). Naval Technology (2017b) noted that the Anzac 
class displaces 3,600 tons fully loaded, has a length of 118m with a beam of 
14.8m, and carries a crew of 174 personnel (Naval Technology, 2017b). The 
design of the Anzac is “based on the Blohm + Voss MEKO 200 modular design 
which utilizes a basic hull and construction concept to provide flexibility in the 
choice of command and control, weapons, equipment and sensors” (Naval 
Technology, 2017b). Given the success of the Anzac frigates, the RAN is moving 
forward with a new class of frigates that will need to incorporate a flexible and 
adaptable design to meet the growing demand for an efficient, sophisticated, and 
technologically advanced warship. 
According to Goldsmith (2016), the new Future Frigate initiative launched 
by the Royal Australian Navy is known as the SEA5000 Program. Anticipating an 
increased military presence in the Asia-Pacific region from both non-state and 
state actors by 2035, the RAN will need a frigate capable of deterrence and 
power projection (Goldsmith, 2016). SEA5000 “will oversee the acquisition of 
nine high-capability Future Frigates and these major surface combatants will be 
capable of Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW), with a strong 
emphasis on Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)” (Goldsmith, 2016).  
 23
1. Future Frigate Mandatory Design Characteristics 
Given the anticipated threat in the volatile regions of the South China Sea 
and East China Sea, the RAN has stated that five critical capability criteria should 
be incorporated into the Future Frigate design (Goldsmith, 2016). Goldsmith 
(2016) noted that these five characteristics are essential to the long-term success 
of a flexible and adaptable warship: 
1. Low Crewing Requirement: Due to RAN personnel shortages, the 
Future Frigates must be capable of safely operating with crew of 
less than 174. 
Goldsmith (2016) noted that due to manning shortages within the RAN, 
the Australian DOD has stated that the crew size must not exceed that of the 
current Anzac frigate, 174 personnel. He pointed out that since naval personnel 
account for about 50 percent of a ship’s operating and sustainment life-cycle 
costs, it would be advantageous for the RAN to cut long-term costs by building a 
flexible and adaptable ship that reduces costs through manpower (Goldsmith, 
2016). 
2. RAN Combat Capability Preferences: The Future Frigates must be 
capable of supporting the CEAFAR S/L/X radar suite with the SAAB 
9LV Combat System and Aegis Fire Control System (FCS). It is 
also inferred that the RAN will insist on the inclusion of the multi-
purpose Mk-41 Vertical Launching System (VLS) as the ships’ 
principal weapons battery. 
Given the rapid growth in technologically advanced weapons over the last 
two decades, the new Future Frigate must incorporate a design that allows for 
continued growth without major, costly overhauls. The Future Frigate design 
must have “sufficient growth margins to accept new technologies as they mature” 
(Goldsmith, 2016). To accommodate this growth margin, the original design must 
have “significant surplus space, weight, power and cooling margins” (Goldsmith, 
2016).  
3. Flexibility: The Future Frigates must be capable of accepting 
mission-specific modules, as well as providing full hangar and 
logistics support for two HM-60R helicopters. 
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4. Ship Survivability: The Future Frigates must be capable of 
operating in the projected higher-threat environment of future 
decades, even without access to ‘external support’. The Future 
Frigates must also be capable of remaining partially functional even 
after suffering battle damage, and particularly due to the higher-
threat operating environment of future decades. Ship survivability is 
a pivotal aspect of the Future Frigate design since the RAN major 
surface combatant fleet is numerically finite, thus cannot lose a 
single ship without severe repercussions for the RAN’s capacity to 
sustain ship deployments over protracted periods. 
5. Growth Margin: The Future Frigates must have sufficient surplus 
space, weight, electrical power and industrial-grade cooling to 
accommodate new ‘game-changing’ technologies as they mature in 
the period through 2035. For instance, high-energy directed energy 
weapons are anticipated to mature over this period and promise to 
revolutionise naval operations. (Goldsmith, 2016) 
2. Potential Designs 
Initial designs were submitted from eight different countries with a history 
of designing and building flexible and adaptable vessels including France, 
Germany, Britain, Spain, Denmark, The Netherlands, Italy, and Australia (Kerr, 
2017). Ultimately, Fincantieri of Italy, Navantia of Spain, and British Aerospace 
(BAE) were selected to “refine their designs and prepare their commercial 
proposals for the comparative evaluation process (CEP) (Kerr, 2017). Kerr 
(2017) found that Fincantieri has built four FREMM frigates for the Italian Navy, 
with another four in production and two left to build. The RAN variant of the 
Bergamini class would not require modification to the existing hull design, already 
has twin helicopter hangars, and would create a large support structure with a 
family of 19 vessels (Kerr, 2017). Navantia designed the RAN Hobart class of Air 
Warfare Destroyers (AWD), and the Future Frigate design would be a modified 
F-100 Frigate (Goldsmith, 2016) that “would benefit from more than 75 percent of 
systems commonality with the AWDs and about 40 percent with the Anzac class” 
(Kerr, 2017). BAE has designed the Type 26 Global Combat Ship for the British 
Royal Navy, and the RAN version of the global combat ship stands to benefit 
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from the mature Type 26 design already in production (Kerr, 2017). Final design 
selection for the Future Frigate will occur in 2018 (Goldsmith, 2016). 
The Royal Australian Navy is pushing the design boundaries of flexible 
and adaptable ships to meet the evolving needs of a global navy with a deep 
blue water reach and shrinking defense budgets. With a clear and concise list of 
critical capability criteria, the RAN will ensure that the Future Frigate will be able 
to meet the defense needs of the Australian people. 
G. UNITED STATES NAVY 
As the United States Navy began to phase out its fleet of 51 Oliver Hazard 
Perry class frigates, it began to look for a high-tech platform that could be used 
as a replacement (Osborn, 2015). The end result was the Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS) in two variants: the trimaran-hull Independence and the mono-hull 
Freedom. Stashwick (2016) pointed out that the LCS concept was a highly 
flexible and adaptable ship that would allow the U.S. Navy to operate in littoral 
areas with a focus on maritime security and anti-piracy (Stashwick, 2016). “The 
ships were designed to be high-speed (over 40 knots) and highly maneuverable, 
with the ability to swap out modules to provide mission-specific capabilities like 
anti-submarine, anti-surface, and mine-clearing” (Stashwick, 2016). Doerry 
(2012) noted that both variants of the LCS included a mission bay in the design 
to house elements of mission packages. Within the LCS class, “mission 
packages are composed of mission modules, aircraft, and crew detachments to 
support the mission modules and aircraft” (Doerry, 2012, p.129). 
1. LCS—Freedom 
Currently, 13 Freedom class littoral combat ships have been ordered, and 
4 have been commissioned. USS Freedom (LCS-1) was commissioned in 
November 2008; USS Fort Worth (LCS-3), in September 2012; USS Milwaukee 
(LCS-5), in November 2015; and USS Detroit (LCS-7), in October 2016 (Jane’s 
IHS Markit, 2016a).  
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The Freedom class is built on a steel mono-hull and is capable of 
performing three mission packages: anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface 
warfare (ASuW), and mine countermeasures (MCM) (Jane’s IHS Markit, 2016a). 
LCS-1 has an overall length of 115.3m, and all subsequent Freedom class 
vessels are 118.3m to improve through-water performance; the beam of LCS-1 is 
17.5m, while the remaining class is 17.6m; the bow of LCS-5 and all subsequent 
models have been modified from LCS-1 and LCS-3 (Jane’s IHS Markit, 2016a). 
LCS-1 has a maximum tonnage of 3,360 tons and the remaining Freedom class 
reaches a maximum tonnage of 3,480 tons and all variants carry a crew of 50 
(Jane’s IHS Markit, 2016a). 
The flexible design “incorporates a large reconfigurable seaframe to allow 
rapidly interchangeable mission modules, a flight deck with integrated helicopter 
launch, recovery, and handling systems and the capability to launch and recover 
maritime vehicles (manned and unmanned) from the stern side” (Jane’s IHS 
Markit, 2016a). Modular payload on the LCS comprises three modular weapons 
stations that can accommodate either a gun (MK 46 30mm gun) or missile 
module (Lockheed Martin AGM 114L Longbow Hellfire) (Jane’s IHS Markit, 
2016a). 
Stashwick (2016) found that the low total gross weight allows the LCS 
class to obtain speeds greater than 40 knots. He noted that the design trade-off 
for speed was sustained battle damage capability. He pointed out that where 
other surface combatants could withstand and potentially recover from sustained 
high-intensity conflict, the Freedom class would likely result in abandonment of 
the vessel in the same type of conflict (Stashwick, 2016).  
2. LCS—Independence 
The Independence class of littoral combat ships has commissioned four 
ships with another six in construction and four more ordered. USS Independence 
(LCS-2) was commissioned in January 2010; USS Coronado (LCS-4), in April 
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2014; USS Jackson (LCS-6), in December 2015; and USS Montgomery (LCS-8), 
in September 2016(Jane’s IHS Markit, 2016b). 
The Independence class is designed on an aluminum trimaran hull form 
based on a commercial ferry design used by the Norwegian company Fred Olsen 
(Jane’s IHS Markit, 2016b). As with the Freedom class, the Independence is 
capable of performing three mission packages: anti-submarine warfare (ASW), 
anti-surface warfare (ASuW), and mine countermeasures (MCM) (Jane’s IHS 
Markit, 2016b). The Independence class has an overall length of 128.5m (about 
10 meters longer than Freedom), with a top speed of 50kts (Jane’s IHS Markit, 
2016b). The beam of Independence is 31.6m (approximately twice that of 
Freedom), which can accommodate the MH-5E heavy-lift helicopter (used 
primary for mine countermeasures), with a full load displacement of 3,188 
tonnes, and a crew of 40 personnel (Jane’s IHS Markit, 2016b). 
The flexible design incorporates a “reconfigurable seaframe to allow 
rapidly interchangeable mission modules” that include three modular weapon 
stations (Jane’s IHS Markit, 2016b). “The two gun modules are each built around 
a Mk 46 30mm gun” (Jane’s IHS Markit, 2016b), and the missile module has 
been fielded with the Longbow Hellfire, a millimeter wave RF, fire-and-forget, 
high explosive anti-tank missile. The Independence class features a side-ramp 
with roll-on/roll-off capability, and can carry two 11m RHIBs (rigid hull inflatable 
boat) “available for use by boarding teams carrying small arms” (Jane’s IHS 
Markit, 2016b). 
3. Small Surface Combatant 
The United States Navy originally contracted 52 Littoral Combat Ships, but 
in January of 2014 Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel “instructed the Navy that 
there would be no new contracts awarded for LCS production beyond 32 ships” 
(Osborn, 2015). Osborn (2015) noted that in place of the remaining 20 littoral 
combat ships, the Navy will build a Small Surface Combatant ship and cited that 
on 15 January 2015, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus stated that the new class 
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of ship was required to have frigate-like capabilities and thus would change the 
designation of the last 20 ships from LCS to FF (Osborn, 2015).  
The new frigate will capitalize on the two existing hull variants used in the 
Freedom and Independence classes (Eckstein, 2015b). Speaking at an American 
Society for Naval Engineers event, CAPT Dan Brintzinghoffer stated the new 
frigate would take the basic LCS design but differ in the following ways: 
It will be more lethal, more survivable, and will be able to conduct 
surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare simultaneously, 
whereas the LCS had to choose only one mission package to work 
with at any given time. It will have a torpedo decoy, variable depth 
sonar and multi-function towed array permanently onboard, rather 
than included in a part-time mission package for LCS; will deploy 
two 7-meter rigid-hull inflatable boats rather than the 11-meter 
RHIBs on the LCS surface warfare package; and will retain the Mk 
50 30mm guns rather than converting to the more common 25mm 
gun. The ship will be up gunned with a SeaRAM anti-ship missile 
system, a ship-launched Hellfire missile system and an over-the-
horizon surface-to-surface missile system. (Eckstein, 2015b) 
The new class of frigates will trade the high-speed capability of the LCS class in 
order to accommodate the additional weight created by the heavier armor for 
increased survivability (Eckstein, 2015b). To make the new frigate class cost-
efficient, CAPT Brintzinghoffer stated commonality will be required across both 
variants and will likely need to share some modular aspects with the LCS class 
or some commonalities with other classes of surface combatants (Eckstein, 
2015b). 
This new class of frigates represents an opportunity for the U.S. Navy to 
build on an existing hull capitalizing on cost-savings in the early design process, 
and incorporate more advanced flexible and adaptable modules in the payload 
design. A proven example of a flexible and adaptable frigate with modular 
payload with similar tonnage is the MEKO A-200 class frigate. The MEKO class 
family is designed for sustained battle damage and could provide guidance for 
enhanced survivability options for this new class of American frigates.  
 29
H. REAL OPTIONS VALUATION WITH FLEXIBLE SHIPS 
The United States Navy needs to develop a more sophisticated method 
for flexible and adaptable ship design if it is going to keep pace with a rapidly 
evolving worldwide threat. Caprace & Rigo (2010) noted that in the past, ship 
design relied on highly experienced naval architects who were well versed in a 
straight-forward ship design that was fixed and rigid (Caprace & Rigo, 2010). 
This outdated method of ship design is becoming cost-prohibitive when looking at 
the lifetime life-cycle cost for upgrades, overhauls, and drives inflexibility for rapid 
mission change (Koenig, Czapiewski & Hootman, 2008). Due to the rigidity in the 
build and failure to build with growth margin, U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers 
are failing to meet their designed service lives by almost 10 years (Doerry, 2012).  
Ship design needs to be approached using flexible and adaptable designs. 
This method assumes that the possible set of requirements for the ship design 
are so great, that it is prohibitively expensive to attempt to design a ship 
incorporating every desired feature (Mun & Housel, in press). Instead, “[t]he key 
to modular adaptable design is incorporating options in the design to be able to 
defer the exact configuration of the ship to that point in time when the 
requirements are known, and to have the capability to affordably modify the 
ship’s configuration to meet the requirements when they become known” 
(Doerry, 2012, p.127).  
Moving forward with flexible and adaptable ship design requires 
sophistication and finesse. One valuable tool on the market to assist the U.S. 
Navy with evaluating the inherent risk in adaptable and flexible ship design is 
Real Options Valuation (ROV). Mun & Housel noted that Real Options Valuation 
is a systematic approach and integrated solution that uses various inputs 
including modeling, statistics, and economic analysis to provide decision makers 
a varied set of options from which to choose. They stated ROV is a powerful tool 
in this situation because traditional Return on Investment (ROI) cannot be 
applied to these assets (Mun & Housel, in press). 
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By examining the Knowledge Value Added (KVA) of the ship design, a 
common unit of output (CUO) will be developed that will allow decision makers to 
assess the actual cost and value of people, systems, or processes within the 
design (Mun & Housel, in press). KVA ultimately delivers two metrics—Return on 
Knowledge (ROK) and Return on Knowledge Investment (ROKI)—that can be 
used to generate input for real options analysis (Mun & Housel, in press). Finally, 
Integrated Risk Management (IRM) builds on the portfolio of options available in 
the design process by using quantitative software to provide objective 
quantification of risk, flexibility, strategy, and decision analysis (Mun & Housel, in 
press).  
Real Options Valuation allows shipbuilders to design for uncertainty. “In 
the design state, options analysis enables more realistic assessments of 
technologies and design features that add flexibility during development and 
adaptability during the post-commissioning life cycle” (Koenig, 2009, p. 95). ROV 
creates five options: option to expand, option to contract, option to wait or defer 
an investment, option to choose between different assets, and option to vary the 
mix (Koenig, 2009). According to Mun & Housel (in press), Real Options 
Valuation is a quantitative approach to ascertaining the amount of risk in a 
modular build when the risk is unknown. They noted that by using simulation, a 
portfolio of options can be presented to the design team, allowing for a looser 
build that has margin for growth or mission change. The portfolio of options 
created using Real Options analysis can be cost driven or payload specific, 
forcing the design to accept some risk in the final product (Mun & Housel, in 
press). 
By incorporating the theories of Real Options Valuation (ROV), Knowledge 
Value Added (KVA), and Integrated Risk Management (IRM) into existing design 
builds, the U.S. Navy can begin to design a “sufficiently sized and relevant future 
surface combatant fleet that can be built and supported within the available 
budget. Modular Adaptable Ships (MAS) technologies offer an opportunity for a 
ship to affordably transform its mission systems over its service life to maintain 
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military relevance” (Doerry, 2012, p.126). Mun & Housel (in press) point out that 
by using Monte Carlo Simulation, thousands of iterations can be run to determine 
possible outcomes for flexible and adaptable ship design. They conclude that 
ROV, KVA, and IRM can provide naval architects, senior leadership, and 
decision makers the opportunity to exercise the strategic ability to either move 
forward with a portion of the ship design or abandon it because the initial 
uncertain risk has become known over time (Mun & Housel, in press). 
Incorporating the use of Integrated Risk Management with flexible and adaptable 
ship design will provide the U.S. Navy with a future surface combatant fleet 
capable of sustaining rapid reconfiguration with growth margin for future 
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III. BUILDING FLEXIBLE SHIPS 
A. CURRENT CONVENTIONAL SURFACE COMBATANT SHIP DESIGNS  
Faced with evolving threats in the South China Sea, the re-emergence of 
the Russian fleets in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and the required 
ongoing sustained presence in the Persian Gulf, U.S. Naval surface combatants 
must be capable of operating in diverse environments and have flexibility in their 
operational design. With computer processing power doubling almost every two 
years, declining Department of Defense budgets, and the rising costs of building 
and maintaining the fleet, future surface combatants need to be built with 
flexibility in order “to ensure affordable relevance over the ship’s life cycle” 
(Sturtevant, 2015). 
Current surface combatant ship designs are bogged down by a myriad of 
legacy ship designs that exhibit limited or no growth margin for capability 
upgrades as technology advances. According to Sturtevant (2015), upgrades 
have become costly and prolonged due to inflexible architectures, and payloads 
(capabilities) are strongly coupled to the platforms (ships) (Sturtevant, 2015). 
Surface combatants are falling short of their expected life cycle and are “failing to 
stay relevant over their entire service life” (Sturtevant, 2015). 
Figure 1 illustrates the current conventional surface combatant service life. 
A ship is expected to have a service life of 40 years, but even after Mid-Life 
Modernization, surface combatants are falling short of their service-life 
expectancy by 15 years. Figure 1 illustrates that the Mid-Life Modernization is 
providing only an additional 5 years of operational capability for a cost that was 
intended to last 20 years. By failing to meet expected life cycle, a tremendous 
financial burden is placed on the Navy to supplement the fleet with newer surface 
combatants. To break this trend, future ship design needs to move towards 
modularity, flexibility, and adaptability.  
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 Conventional Surface Combatant Service Life Source: Figure 1. 
Sturtevant (2015). 
B. FLEXIBLE SHIP DESIGN 
In order to increase the longevity of surface combatants, future ship 
designs must incorporate weight and space allowances for upgrades and future 
technological advances. Built-in growth margin can reduce extended yard 
periods, allowing the platform to return to an operational readiness status in a 
shorter period of time at a reduced cost. In January 2014, VADM Thomas 
Rowden, Commander Naval Surface Forces, stated “Making the move to 
modularity will further allow us to maximize the service life of our ships as we will 
be able to upgrade the combat systems equipment to more and easily and 
affordably keep pace with rapidly advancing technology” (Sturtevant, 2015). By 
adopting flexible ship designs that incorporate modularity in both design and 
payload, the U.S. Navy will be able to continuously meet the evolving demands 
placed upon it. 
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1. Five Tenets of Flexible Ship Design 
Sturtevant (2017) stated that flexible ship design is based on five primary 
tenets: 
 Decoupled Payloads (capabilities) from Platforms (ships)  
 Standard Platform-to-Payload Interfaces  
 Rapid Reconfiguration  
 Pre-Planned Access Routes  
 Sufficient Service Life Allowance Growth Margins (Sturtevant, 
2017) 
Decoupling payloads from platforms allows the payload to be developed in 
parallel with the platform. As technology advances and processing power 
doubles every two years under Moore’s Law, there is a significant cost savings 
advantage to installing a payload or C4I system just prior to or immediately 
following commissioning. In decoupled environments, “weapons or sensors can 
be easily replaced for ship mission adaptability” (Sturtevant, 2015). This type of 
decoupled payload can be seen in the Danish SF 300 class and the follow-on 
Absalon and Huitfeldt flexible ships. 
Standard Platform-to-Payload Interfaces allow C5I (Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Collaboration, and Intelligence) modules or 
weapons modules to operate in a plug-and-play environment. These interfaces 
should maximize commonality to allow cross-platform use of the module. Using a 
specific module on more than one class of ship reduces the overall cost of the 
module and provides mission flexibility. Weapons modules built for the Danish 
SF 300 incorporated a standard interface that translated onto the Absalon and 
Huitfeldt ships. As the Navy moves forward with the new frigate on the hulls of 
LCS Independence and LCS Freedom, the frigate missile and gun module 
interfaces should be configured the same as LCS to capitalize on code cost 
savings. 
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Rapid reconfiguration refers to “specific C5I compartments that can easily 
be reconfigured with upgraded equipment or new systems” (Sturtevant, 2015). 
Navy CANES (Consolidated Afloat Network Enterprise Systems) is a primary 
example of a system that would benefit from flexible ship designs that 
incorporated rapid reconfiguration. CANES requires software upgrades every two 
years and hardware upgrades every four years, which means upgrades cannot 
wait until a Mid-Life Modernization. In a flexible ship design, server racks and 
network access points are located in highly accessible areas. This design feature 
would facilitate rapid CANES upgrades with minimal loss of operational time for 
the ship. 
Pre-planned access routes are “used for the easy removal and 
replacement of interior equipment or systems” (Sturtevant, 2015). This implies 
that pre-planned access routes need to exceed the standard-size passageway. 
The incorporation of a larger or broader passageway(s) can increase the size 
and weight of a ship during design, increasing the overall cost. The long-term 
advantage to these larger passageways is the ability to remove or add equipment 
without having to undergo an extensive yard period that could potentially involve 
the need to cut the hull of the ship or cut large holes in the superstructure. LPD-
17 incorporated the use of a larger “main” passageway as part of its flexible 
design. CANES hardware upgrades is an example of a C5I system that would 
benefit from a pre-planned access route. 
Sufficient Service Life Allowance Growth Margins incorporate “space and 
weight for future capabilities, and provision for projected demand for distributed 
systems such as electric power, cooling, and network bandwidth” (Sturtevant, 
2015). A ship designed with zero growth margin will undergo sustained and 
costly yard periods for technological upgrades that could require extensive cuts 
to the hull and superstructure. Additionally, without growth margin, a ship may 
not be able accommodate newer technology, leaving the Navy with a platform 
that will not be able to meet service-life expectancy. In a flexible ship design, as 
with the LPD-17, weight and space were reserved for the Vertical Launch System 
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(VLS), although it has not been installed. By reserving the weight and space for 
this system and equipping the space with the correct standard interfaces, 
distributed power, and cooling, LPD-17 can choose to install VLS at a later time 
without significant cuts to the hull or prolonged delays in its return to operational 
readiness. 
2. Benefits of Flexible Ship Design 
If incorporated into the design of future combatant surface vessels, 
Sturtevant’s five tenets of flexible ship design will create a naval force capable of 
rapid deployment into any environment with the ability to change configuration to 
meet mission requirements. According to Sturtevant (2015), flexible design 
embodies adaptability, modularity, commonality, and scalability, and he 
concluded that the following benefits are derived from flexible ship design:  
separation of payload development and platform production; 
affordable alternate business model to lengthy and costly ship 
production work; increased competition and innovation; cross-
platform commonality; rapid prototyping of payloads enables rapid 
acquisition of new capabilities; modular open systems enable 
acquisition agility; efficient technology refresh and incremental 
upgrades; and paces the threat. (Sturtevant, 2017). 
Figure 2 illustrates the benefits of flexible ship design. Unlike conventional 
ship design, flexible ships do not undergo one large Mid-Life Modernization. 
Instead, flexible ships undergo periodic payload replacement and technology 
refresh, which allows the vessel to maintain a higher readiness rating. The 
flexible ship model should allow a platform to meet its life-cycle expectancy while 
maintaining combat relevance. 
 38
 
 Potential Benefits of Flexible Ship Design. Figure 2. 
Source: Sturtevant (2015). 
C. CONVENTIONAL/FLEXIBLE CASE STUDY 
Moving forward, the U.S. Navy needs to design future surface combatants 
that will meet life-cycle expectancy. The following chapters looked at two 
individual case studies that highlight the benefits of building flexible ships. Case 
Study 1 examined the benefits of building modular payloads and specifically 
addresses the missile payload for LCS. Case Study 2 examined the use of a 
planned access route to assist with future installation of IT assets, movement of 
troops, and ease of maintenance on LPD-17. Additionally, Case Study 2 
reviewed the benefits of reserving weight and space for the future installation of 
VLS on LPD-17 if ever required.  
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IV. CASE STUDY 1—LCS MISSILE MODULE 
A. LCS MISSILE MODULE BACKGROUND 
LCS Freedom and Independence were designed to incorporate modular 
payloads and both classes of ship have three modular weapons stations that can 
accommodate either a gun or missile module (Janes, 2016a; Janes, 2016b). The 
Surface to Surface Missile Module (SSMM) serves as the principal weapon within 
the LCS Anti-Surface Warfare Mission Package (Scott, 2017). The initial LCS 
modular missile payload was to be fielded by the U.S. Army’s XM-501 Non-Line-
of Sight (NLOS) modular missile and was in development to become the 
“cornerstone of the new, highly maneuverable light brigade” (Defense Update, 
2010). The modular design of NLOS had immediate crossover capability for the 
U.S. Navy and was a perfect fit for LCS. According to Defense Update (2010), 
the NLOS program was canceled in 2010 after a review of its precision fires 
capabilities and requirements when it struck only two of six targets during its 
Limited User Test (LUT) (Defense Update, 2010). 
As the primary anti-surface weapon for LCS, NLOS had over-the-horizon 
targeting with a range of 30 nautical miles and could be launched as individual 
missiles at a specific target or in salvos of multiple missiles to cover larger areas 
in support of friendly forces ashore (Defense Update, 2010). It consisted of two 
separate variants: the Precision Attack Munition (PAM) and Loitering Attack 
Munition (LAM) (Rogoway, 2014). Designed for modularity, NLOS could be 
“rapidly rearmed at sea by helicopter, therefore extending its combat endurance 
over extended missions” (Defense Update, 2010). With LCS Freedom and 
Independence already commissioned at the time the program was cancelled, the 
Navy was left without a missile payload but continued to meet deployment cycles 
with a limited Anti-Surface Mission Module. 
The initial replacement for NLOS was Raytheon’s Griffin B missile. 
Rogoway (2014) noted that the Griffin B missile relied on either GPS/inertial 
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guidance (exact coordinates programmed before launch) for successful 
engagement or laser targeting (operator pinpoints target until contact). He 
pointed out that using laser pinpoint or GPS/inertial guidance in a swarming boat 
attack were time-intensive evolutions that prevented LCS from preforming its 
mission effectively. He found that that in order to alter the Griffin B missile to 
make it a more desirable missile for LCS, Raytheon would have had to “integrate 
a new RF (radio frequency) seeker into the missile” (Rogoway, 2014). The time 
required and the cost for upgrades to make the Griffin B a viable option forced 
the Navy to look for alternative potential missile modules (Rogoway, 2014).  
Rogoway (2014) stated that with NLOS and Griffin B no longer options, 
the Navy decided to look at existing inventory that could be modified to meet the 
LCS missile module. He pointed out that this decision ultimately led the Navy to 
look at the Army’s Apache Longbow Hellfire AGM-114L by Lockheed Martin. He 
noted that the Longbow is a millimeter wave RF, fire-and-forget, high-explosive 
anti-tank missile with demonstrated effective performance against maritime 
targets. It has a range of 6–8 km (well short of NLOS’s 30NM) and there are 
thousands of Hellfires in DOD inventory (Rogoway, 2014). Unlike the Griffin’s 
laser pinpoint requirements, the fire-and-forget technology of the Hellfire allows 
LCS to fire at a target, or multiple targets, and immediately flee (Rogoway, 2014). 
With a large existing Hellfire inventory and proven technology, the Navy modified 
the AGM-114L to meet the vertical launch needs of the LCS Surface Warfare 
Mission Module and “engineering development tests of Longbow Hellfire missiles 
modified for use on LCS vessels were successfully conducted in June 2015” and 
“on 28 February, the U.S. Navy conducted a successful structural test firing of 
the LCS SSMM from the Freedom variant LCS USS Detroit (LCS 7)” (Scott, 
2017).  
B. ADVANTAGE OF MODULARITY 
NLOS was designed to serve as a “missile in a box” (Defense Update, 
2010) and fulfills three of Sturtevant’s primary flexible ship tenets: decoupled 
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payload, standard interfaces, and rapid reconfiguration. If NLOS had been 
designed as a structurally integral part of the ship, program cancellation would 
have resulted in extended and expensive yard periods with significant loss in 
LCS operational tempo while the old system was ripped out and a new 
structurally integral system was installed. With NLOS being modular, LCS was 
able to continue in production and meet deployment obligations while a new 
missile system was developed in parallel. With module development happening 
in parallel, the U.S. Navy created an environment where it could explore multiple 
viable options before deciding on the Longbow Hellfire as a capable substitute 
module for NLOS.  
1. Standard Interface 
Development of a missile module in parallel with the platform can only be 
accomplished through the use of standard interfaces. Standard Interfaces within 
a ship’s Combat Management System (CMS) allow weapon modules to be 
removed and replaced without disruption to the system. Within the framework of 
LCS’s CMS is the Module Engagement Controller (MEC), which features two 
standard interfaces: one for the gun engagement processor and one for the 
missile engagement processor. The Module Engagement Controller is able to 
communicate with the vessel’s CMS whether zero, one, or both modules are 
connected. This feature enabled LCS to continue to deploy, and engage and fire 
the gun module without a fielded missile module connected to the system. Figure 
3 illustrates the LCS Combat Management System with the Gun Engagement 
Processor connected and capable of engagement without having a missile 
module connected. Figure 4 illustrates how the missile module rapidly integrates 
into the Module Engagement Controller and communicates with the Combat 
Management System. The overall architecture of the CMS demonstrates the 
added benefits of a decoupled payload that employs a standard interface.  
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 LCS Combat Management System with the Gun Module Figure 3. 
Integrated through a Standard Interface 
 
 
 LCS Combat Management System with Missile and Gun Figure 4. 
Modules Integrated through Standard Interfaces 
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The use of a standard interface on the Module Engagement Controller 
forces contractors and vendors to code any potential future missile module to 
meet the specific parameters of that interface. This design prevents potential 
massive recoding costs to the entire Combat Management System architecture. 
Standard interfaces prevent the insertion of new coding into the CMS that could 
require middleware to link legacy code and new code throughout the life cycle of 
the CMS. By placing the burden on the contractor to build to a standard interface, 
the U.S. Navy is reducing long-term maintenance costs while achieving the 
following benefits of modularity noted by Sturtevant (2017): affordable alternate 
business model to lengthy and costly ship production work (in this case study, 
lengthy ship production equates to recoding requirements to the CMS); increased 
competition and innovation; cross-platform commonality (in this case study, LCS 
modules are to share cross-platform commonality with the new Frigate); rapid 
prototyping of payloads enables rapid acquisition of new capabilities; modular 
open systems enable acquisition agility; efficient technology refresh and 
incremental upgrades; and paces the threat (Sturtevant, 2017). 
2. Flexible or Rigid Design for Weapons Modules 
The advantage to modularity and the use of decoupled payloads allows a 
vessel to continuously evolve and grow as the threat and technology evolve and 
grow. Through the use of a standard interface, new modules can be designed in 
parallel with the platform, preventing extended yard periods for structural refit. 
Figure 5 illustrates a real options valuation decision tree for continued module 
technological growth and capability on LCS. 
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 LCS Weapons Module Decision TreeFigure 5. 
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(1) Structurally Integral Weapons Design 
If the design incorporates structurally integral weapons systems that 
interact with the Combat Management System through the use of non-standard 
interfaces, future upgrades will require prolonged yard periods (12–18 months) 
and extensive rewrite to the CMS architecture when the system is finally 
upgraded. Given the expense of ripping out and installing a new weapons 
system, the ship is less likely to experience as many upgrades as a flexible and 
adaptable ship. If the XM-501 Non-Line-of-Sight had been built as a structurally 
integral part of LCS, the U.S. Navy would have faced two decisions: continue and 
finalize development of a missile program the Army canceled at its own expense; 
or redesign the ship for a different structurally integral weapons system. Both 
options would carry significant increased contract costs and experience 
protracted time delays in future LCS production.  
A more rigid design only allows upgrades to happen in series and not in 
parallel as illustrated by Figure 5. Weapons development in series does not offer 
the U.S. Navy the option to defer and wait as with the flexible design. Weapons 
development in series limits the U.S. Navy to one specific design that could 
potentially be technologically outdated by the time it is installed on every 
platform. Structurally integral weapons prevent a platform from rapidly evolving 
as the mission evolves, and subsequently the ship fails to meet its intended life 
cycle through extended maintenance costs and obsolete weapons technology. 
Figure 6 illustrates the complicated recoding of the Combat Management 
System architecture that would be required when non-standard interfaces are 
used on systems that are structurally integral to the ship. Without the use of a 
standard interface, LCS would need to recode the CMS, Engagement 
Coordination, and the Module Engagement Controller in order for the new 
weapons system to interact with the Engagement Processor. Again, this could 
introduce middleware that poorly interacts with CMS architecture legacy code 
and could cause delays in the deployability of the system. 
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 LCS Weapons Module Coding Requirements through the Use of Non-standard InterfacesFigure 6. 
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(2) Flexible Ship Weapons Design 
Rigid, structurally integral weapons systems are expensive and time 
intensive to remove and replace. A flexible module design for the weapons 
system permits the payload to be developed in parallel to ship production, 
creating an environment where the platform is ready to receive weapons 
technology that mirrors the most current capabilities.  
The decision tree in Figure 5 illustrates weapons module development in 
parallel. With NLOS cancelled, the U.S. Navy did not have to delay LCS 
production as it would have with a structurally integral vertical launch missile 
system. The “plug-and-play” standard interface allowed industry to innovate and 
compete to present the U.S. Navy with a new missile module, with the onus on 
the vendor to correctly code for smooth integration with the Combat Management 
System. When Raytheon’s Griffin B proved an unsuitable match for the missile 
module as the initial replacement for NLOS, LCS’s operational tempo was not 
hindered and a “better fit” solution was developed—the Longbow Hellfire.  
Employing the tools of Real Options Valuation is evident in the flexible 
weapons design. Figure 5 presents the U.S. Navy with choices and decisions 
throughout the life cycle of the ship. Through the use of standard interfaces, the 
U.S. Navy can continue to use the current weapons module while simultaneously 
evaluating newer, more sophisticated alternatives. If the new alternatives do not 
meet the evolving threat or needs of the platform at the time, the U.S. Navy can 
defer the decision to integrate a new module until a later point. With a rigid 
design, there is no deferment option due to the structural overhaul required. 
Modularity facilitates rapid removal and replacement of a system with extremely 
limited down time. The benefits of standard interfaces are represented in Figure 
7. Standard interfaces remove a substantial financial burden to the U.S. Navy by 
forcing the vendor to code the new weapons module to the existing CMS 
architecture and not the other way around.  
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 LCS Weapons Module Coding Requirements through the Use of Standard Interface Figure 7. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
When the U.S. Army cancelled the XM-501 Non-Line-of-Sight modular 
missile program, the U.S. Navy was left without a missile module for the Anti-
Surface Mission Module package for LCS. If NLOS had been structurally integral 
to the LCS ship design, LCS would have experienced significant and prolonged 
production delays, or immediate overhaul after production to rip out the NLOS 
structure and install the new missile system. In actuality, the cancellation of 
NLOS is a case study for why modularity works. Figures 3 through 7 highlight 
and illustrate the benefits of modularity: the ability to continuously develop and 
integrate a new module without extensive loss of operational deployability or 
prolonged and expensive yard periods. Table 1 is a summation of the benefits of 
using a flexible weapons module design versus a conventional, structurally 
integral weapons system.  
Table 1.   Flexible Ship Design versus Conventional Ship Design 
with Regard to Payload 




Platform decoupled from payload   
Standard platform to payload interface   
Rapid Reconfiguration   
Allowance margins for modernization   
Prolonged yard periods for payload 
upgrades 
  
Shorter yard periods for payload 
upgrades 
  
Payload upgrades done in series   
Payload upgrades done in parallel   
Vendor responsible for coding 
requirements to meet payload 
standard interface 
  
Platform responsible for coding 
upgrades with every new payload 
  
Creates increased competition and 
innovation 
  
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V. CASE STUDY 2—FLEXIBILITY AND ADAPTABILITY 
OF LPD-17 
A. BACKGROUND 
In January 2006, the U.S. Navy commissioned the first of 12 vessels in a 
new class of amphibious ship, USS San Antonio (LPD-17). Design plans for 
LPD-17 began in the early 1990s to replace “41 current and decommissioned 
ships, including the Anchorage (LSD-36) class of dock landing ships, the 
Newport (LST-1179) class of tank landing ships, the Charleston (LKA-113) class 
of amphibious cargo ships, and the Austin (LPD-4) class of landing platform/dock 
ships” (Hyde, 2016). The San Antonio class serves as the main expeditionary 
platform within an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), and the warship is used to 
“embark, transport, and land forces and their equipment and supplies for 
expeditionary warfare” (Hyde, 2016). LPD-17 is maintained by a crew of 374 
personnel (Jane’s IHS Markit, 2017b) and can accommodate a Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) comprising 699 personnel (Balle, 2014). 
The upgrades from LPD-4 to LPD-17 are substantial in both size and cost. 
The Austin class (LPD-4) had a displacement of 19,313.6 tons at full load (Jane’s 
IHS Markit, 2015), while the San Antonio class (LPD-17) has a full displacement 
of 27,447.6 tons (Jane’s IHS Markit, 2017b), a tonnage increase of 42 percent. 
The increase in tonnage came with a substantial price tag of approximately $1.6 
billion (Defense Industry, 2016) per ship, almost two times the original expected 
outlay of $836 million per ship (Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, 
2000) . Although the final cost per ship far exceeded the original cost estimation, 
LPD-17 adopted a flexible and adaptable design that resulted in a “modern, sea-
based platform that is networked, survivable, and designed to operate with 21st 
weapon systems” (Balle, 2014).  
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B. FLEXIBLE AND ADAPTABLE DESIGN FEATURES 
The design approach for the San Antonio class incorporated a multitude of 
features essential to building flexible and adaptable ships capable of meeting 
service-life expectancy. Recognizing the advancements to be made in vertical lift 
and Advanced Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAAVs), LPD-17 was designed for 
future growth margin to accommodate new technologies and platforms working 
from the well deck and flight deck. Additionally, LPD-17 was designed with larger 
main passageways that could facilitate the rapid movement of battle-dressed 
Marines, and assist with the removal and replacement of technological 
equipment such as racks and servers. Finally, in an effort to ensure that LPD-17 
could be capable of distributed lethality, LaGrone (2016) noted that weight and 
space were reserved for the MK-41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) in the bow of 
every San Antonio class ship (LaGrone, 2016).  
1. Growth Margin  
Anticipating technological advances in vertical lift, the San Antonio class 
was designed with growth margin to accommodate future vertical lift platforms 
like the tiltrotor MV-22 Osprey. The MV-22 is a V/STOL aircraft, with the ability to 
perform vertical take-off and landings, or short take-off and landings. This type of 
platform requires the flight deck to be rated for the extremely high heat signature 
generated by the V/STOL capability. In anticipating the production of a future 
vertical lift aircraft with V/STOL parameters, LPD-17 would have referenced the 
heat signature ratings used for the AV-8B Harrier, the other V/STOL aircraft in 
Marine Corps inventory.  
At the time of LPD-17 design, the MV-22 was in initial design phase. 
Adding the tonnage required to rate the flight deck appropriately was a risk the 
Navy accepted in the design approach. By anticipating the need to launch and 
recover V/STOL aircraft on the flight deck at the time of production was a long-
term cost-savings measure that put additional cost on front-end production. Had 
the San Antonio class not anticipated future technological advances in tiltrotor 
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aircraft, each platform stood to lose significant operational deployment time for 
extended and expensive yard periods to refurbish the flight deck when the 
technology became available. Once refurbished, the ship would then need to re-
certify the flight deck before deployment, losing additional operational time. 
Designing for future capabilities was not limited to the flight deck. The 
size, space, and weight reserved for the well deck is substantially larger in 
comparison to the Austin class. As catalogued in Jane’s (2017b), the well deck is 
large enough to support two air-cushioned landing craft (LCAC), or one utility 
landing craft (LCU) capable of carrying the M1 Abrams tank ashore (Jane’s, 
2017b). The well deck can also store/support 14 Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles 
(EFVs) or Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs) (Jane’s, 2017b). According to 
Cavas (2016), the Marine Corps is moving forward with design and development 
of a new Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAAV), but in the interim will 
retrofit its existing inventory to bridge the gap. He noted the retrofit includes 
“upgrading the 392 AAV74A1s with an extensive survivability upgrade intended 
to keep the vehicles effective in an IED environment…and installed 18 new 
shock-mitigation seats, replacing the benches in older AAVs” (Cavas, 2016).  
These upgrades amount to additional weight on the vehicle, which directly 
translates to an increased load that the well deck must be able to support, 
multiplied by at least 14 vehicles. If the LPD-17 well deck had not been designed 
with weight and space reserved for future, heavier, advanced technology, the 
Marine Corps would not be able to effectively protect its Marines and would 
severely diminish the capabilities of the MEU. By designing an expeditionary 
platform that incorporated growth margin into the design of the ship, the San 
Antonio class can more readily maintain combat relevancy throughout its life 
cycle. 
2. Planned Access Routes 
The San Antonio class design incorporated planned access routes by 
incorporating larger main passageways and larger ladderwell openings 
 54
throughout the ship to accommodate ease of movement. Traditional, standard-
size passageways found on the Austin class of LPDs had proved to be both 
bottlenecks and ineffective in the movement of combat-loaded Marines. By 
designing passageways that allowed freedom of movement in a high-stress, 
high-tempo environment, Sailors and Marines could focus on the task at hand. 
The psychological effects of creating a more readily accessible space by 
removing the stresses incurred in small, tight cramped quarters can contribute to 
an expeditionary force more relaxed and better prepared to fight.  
These larger, planned access routes benefit both personnel and 
technology. By creating wider main passageways, information technology (IT) 
equipment can be removed and replaced without having to enter extended yard 
periods to facilitate updates and upgrades. As the U.S. Navy looks to replace 
Raytheon’s Shipboard Wide Area Network (SWAN) onboard the San Antonio 
class with the Consolidated Afloat Network Enterprise System (CANES), the 
larger main passageways can facilitate the rapid removal and replacement of the 
SWAN servers with the CANES servers. CANES is designed to undergo 
software refresh every two years and hardware refresh every four years. If the 
planned access routes did not exist, then the ship could potentially experience a 
minimum of 10 extensive yard periods during the course of its service life to 
accommodate the technology refresh. The planned access routes within a 
flexible and adaptable ship design allow for rapid reconfiguration of IT equipment, 
and future designs should recognize the need to place IT equipment in readily 
accessible areas located on the planned access routes. 
3. Weight and Space Reservations—VLS 
For a surface combatant to achieve service-life expectancy, it must be 
able to evolve and keep pace with the threat. Despite cost overruns, the San 
Antonio class reserved weight and space for future installation of the MK-41 VLS 
in the bow of all 12 ships. Each ship should could potentially install two “8-cell 
modules designed to accommodate a wide variety of missiles” (Seck, 2017). The 
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choice to reserve space and weight specifically for the MK-41 VLS was a 
strategic decision based on the success of the same modular missile cells 
currently installed on Arleigh Burke class destroyers and Ticonderoga class 
cruisers. Should the system be installed at a later point in time, LPD-17 through 
LPD-27 have VLS trunk access and cooling capabilities prepositioned.  
The VLS represents an allowance margin for modernization. Had the 
weight and space, access trunk line interface, and cooling capabilities not been 
reserved and installed at the time of production, the San Antonio class would 
have lost the ability to potentially provide distributed lethality for Marines going 
ashore without a costly and lengthy overhaul that would have resulted in a 
significant loss to operational deployment time. As recently as December 2016, 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Robert Neller, had been pushing for 
the Navy to explore the option of installing VLS on the San Antonio class and 
equipping it with Tomahawk missiles to provide the Marines with longer-range 
fire support (LaGrone, 2016; Seck, 2017). 
Figure 8 represents the current decision tree for LPD-17 through LPD-27. 
Given a standard interface at the VLS trunk access point, the San Antonio class 
can readily accept VLS into its Combat Management System with little to no 
recoding required. Given the modularity of VLS and the standard interface, future 
VLS systems can be developed in parallel, driving industry competition and 
innovation. As a decoupled payload, the coding requirements to seamlessly 
integrate with the VLS standard interface fall on the vendor, a long-term cost 
savings for the U.S. Navy. Additionally, the ability to provide longer-range fire 
support could potentially reduce the number of escort ships (cruisers and 
destroyers) required within the ESG, reducing the burden on other platforms or 
possibly reducing the total number of ships required to meet national security 
directives. Ultimately, the San Antonio class can defer installing any type of VLS 
if it is determined that that form of strike capability is not required to keep pace 




 LPD-17 through LPD-27 VLS Decision Tree Figure 8. 
C. LPD-28 DESIGN DECISIONS 
As the U.S. Navy begins to enter the design phase for the upcoming class 
of amphibious transport docks known as LX(R), the last ship in the San Antonio 
class (LPD-28) has the unique opportunity serve as a bridge for future LX(R) 
requirements (Rogoway, 2016). Ordered but not yet in production, LPD-28 allows 
ship designers to build a more flexible and adaptable ship that will have cross-
platform commonality with LX(R). The additional design costs incurred by LPD-
28 serve as long-term savings cost for LX(R) by reducing uncertainty and risk. 
One potential design change for LPD-28 would be the installation of the 
AEGIS Combat Management. AEGIS provides “a higher level of defensive 
capabilities, independence, and situational awareness” and if installed on LPD-
28, the ship could “operate independent of, and in better concert with the Navy’s 
already over-tasked AEGIS equipped destroyers and cruisers” (Rogoway, 2016). 
There is little risk associated with the installation of an AEGIS Combat 
Management System. A proven capability, it is currently operational on 62 
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Arleigh Burke destroyers and 22 Ticonderoga class cruisers (Rogoway, 2016). If 
equipped with AEGIS, LPD-28’s mission flexibility increases with the added 
ability to operate in moderate to high threat combat environments by transiting 
independently of AEGIS equipped escorts (Rogoway, 2016).  
Moving forward, the design approach for LPD-28 would benefit from 
examining all the available options and creating a portfolio to optimize flexibility 
and adaptability within a constrained budget. Integrated Risk Management and 
Real Options Valuation would provide the design team the opportunity to view 
potential long-term cost savings by investing in up-front growth margins for 
modernization and standard interfaces that allow for more rapid technological 
advances. One option would be to equip the VLS trunk access with multiple 
standard interfaces that directly translate to the AEGIS Combat Management 
System. One interface accepts the firing sequence for Tomahawk Land Attack 
missiles and one interface accepts the firing sequence for the Evolved Sea 
Sparrow surface-to-air-missiles. Both standard interfaces place the cost of coding 
on the vendor for seamless integration with AEGIS.  
Figure 9 represents three possible design options available for LPD-28: 
installation of AEGIS and VLS trunk access, AEGIS installation, or VLS trunk 
access. The first option would prove to be the most costly design, but would 
reduce long-term maintenance costs and provide cross-platform risk reduction for 
LX(R). Figure 10 illustrates the added benefits of distributed lethality if LPD-28 
was equipped with the AEGIS Combat Management System with standard 
interfaces to accept multiple VLS modules.  
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 Possible Configurations for LPD-28 Figure 9. 
 
 
 LPD-28 with AEGIS Combat Management System Figure 10. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The San Antonio class of amphibious transport dock ships was designed 
with weight and space reservations that created allowance margins for 
modernization. The design approach anticipated technological advances in 
vertical lift and well-deck capabilities, which resulted in a combat relevant 
platform capable of accepting new equipment as it became available. Planned 
access routes assist with ease of movement, increase operational readiness, and 
allow for the rapid removal and replacement of technological equipment. Finally, 
As LX(R) enters the design phase, LPD-28 can assist with assessing the costs of 
installing different weapon modules and combat systems that can increase the 
multi-mission capabilities of LX(R). Table 2 summarizes the added benefits of 
designing and building modular, flexible, and adaptable ships. 
Table 2.   Flexible and Adaptable Attributes of San Antonio Class 
 LPD-17 through LPD-27 LPD-28 
Weight and Space 
Reservations 
  
Allowance Margins for 
Modernization 
  
Decoupled Payloads   
Distributed Lethality Enabler   




VLS Trunk Access and 
Cooling Requirements 
  
Potential for AEGIS Combat 
Management System 
  
Potential Stand-Alone Strike 
Platform 
  
Potential VLS Capabilities 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The traditional approach to designing surface combatants has left the U.S. 
Navy with a fleet of warships that exhibit little to no margin for future modernization 
and without the ability to rapidly reconfigure. To meet future demands, keep pace 
with the threat and maintain combat relevancy, the U.S. Navy needs to transition 
away from the traditional, rigid design of surface combatants and instead 
incorporate adaptability and flexibility in the design. As seen with the Danish, 
German, French, Italian and Australian navies, surface combatants with multi-
mission capability and decoupled payloads are vital to the long term sustainability 
of their navies and their ability to effectively operate as a deep water navy.  
With rising long-term maintenance costs and shrinking defense budgets, 
any new class of surface combatant must be designed with a multi-mission 
capability that will see them through a 40-year expected service life. Flexible and 
adaptable ship designs encounter higher initial outlays, but allow for shorter, 
cheaper, and less intrusive maintenance periods over the service life of the vessel. 
Modular payloads with standard interfaces facilitate parallel payload development, 
place the cost of integration on the vendor, and ensure the latest and most 
technologically advanced equipment is available to the warfighter. By designing 
warships with reserved weight and space for future technological upgrades and 
advanced weapon systems, the surface combatant fleet can rapidly reconfigure 
and continue to fight with little to no loss in operational deployment cycles.  
If the U.S. Navy is going to remain the world’s preeminent naval sea power, 
it will have to approach future surface combatant designs with the tenets of 
flexibility and adaptability as integral design elements to maintain combat 
relevancy. Decoupled payloads from platforms, standard interfaces, planned 
access route, rapid reconfiguration, and growth allowance for modernization are 
the cornerstones of building a sustainable fleet capable of pacing the threat while 
seamlessly maturing with technological advances. Failure to recognize the need to 
shift from the traditional approach of rigid ship design to a more open and flexible 
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architecture will drain the defense budget and leave the U.S. Navy with a less than 
capable and aging fleet of warships.  
A. FUTURE SURFACE COMBATANT AREAS OF STUDY LX(R) 
One area of future study with regard to building flexible and adaptable 
ships will be the design, cost, and production of the LX(R). A recently published 
RAND Corporation study on the benefits of building flexible and adaptable ships 
highlighted LX(R) as one of only two platforms (targets) with a production cycle 
set to begin in the next decade whose design phase has the opportunity to 
capitalize on the benefits of a multi-mission, flexible, and adaptable ship design 
(Schank, Savitz, Munson, Perkinson, McGee, & Sollinger, 2016). LX(R) entered 
the preliminary design phase in 2015 and is expected to begin production in FY 
2020 (Eckstein, 2015c), with projected production dates and service-life 
expectancy as highlighted in Figure 11 (Schank et al., 2016). 
 
 Targets for Potential Modular/Flexible Ship Design. Figure 11. 
 Source: Rand (2016). 
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The U.S. Navy has the opportunity to take the lessons learned from the 
flexible and adaptable build of the San Antonio class and apply them to the 
design of the future amphibious dock ship, LX(R). Eckstein (2015c) noted that by 
capitalizing on the hull form of LPD-17, LX(R) will be able to reduce cost and risk 
by designing a ship on an already proven hull form and propulsion system 
(Eckstein, 2015c). This substantial cost reduction allows the ship design 
approach to focus on needed combat systems and technological advances while 
simultaneously increasing modular aspects of the design. By examining the final 
engineering and redesign costs of LPD-28, a comprehensive analysis can be 
conducted to determine the cost-saving benefits of building larger ships with 
weight and space reserved for future technological advances in comparison with 
the final cost production of the LX(R).  
B. INFLUENCING TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS IN FUTURE FLEXIBLE 
AND ADAPTABLE DESIGN 
The 2016 RAND Corporation study titled “Designing Adaptable Ships” 
focused on the need for the U.S. Navy to design modular and flexible ships 
capable of evolving to meet unknown adversaries in the future. The study 
highlighted the importance of building future surface combatants with flexible 
mission bays, additional power and cooling, extra space and volume, accessible 
equipment, and variable crew space in order for the ship to remain relevant over 
the course of its service life (Schank et al., 2016). The authors advocate that 
future ship designs may need to incur higher initial outlays to support bigger 
vessels that provide the “additional volume to change interface boundaries; 
increase the number of personnel; and add power/ cooling, and/or bandwidth as 
needed” (Schank et al., 2016). 
To achieve a fleet of sustainable flexible and adaptable ships, the authors 
anticipated “four major technological trends that would likely influence naval 
operations over the coming decades” (Schank et al., 2016). By acknowledging 
these trends, the U.S. Navy can build a multi-mission fleet with reserved weight, 
space, and power to ultimately integrate advanced technologies that allow a 
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surface combatant to rapidly transform to meet emerging needs. The four 
expected trends are: 
 The increasing use and effectiveness of off-board unmanned 
systems 
 Growing abilities to use the electromagnetic spectrum as a weapon 
 Enhanced capabilities for long-range targeting 
 The increasingly networked nature of the battlespace (Schank et 
al., 2016) 
C. FUTURE AREAS OF STUDY OUTSIDE OF SURFACE COMBATANTS 
Modularity is not limited to the design of surface combatants. One future 
case study would involve the lack of multi-mission flexibility in Sikorsky’s CH-53K 
heavy lift helicopter design. According to Defense Industry (2017), the CH-53E 
Super Stallion is the U.S. Marines’ current heavy lift platform, but it is rapidly 
aging and comes with an estimated $20,000 per flight hour cost ratio (Defense 
Industry, 2017).  
The U.S. Navy also flies an aging variant of the H-53, the MH-53E Sea 
Dragon, capable of heavy lift and Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM). The 
major modular difference between the MH-53E variant and the CH-53E variant is 
the installation of an additional hydraulic system to facilitate the AMCM mission. 
The current CH-53K design did not incorporate the additional hydraulic system to 
make the platform capable of both heavy lift and AMCM. 
Priced at $131 million apiece, the U.S. Marine Corps is set to buy 200 
heavy lift helicopters (Schogol, 2017). If an Engineering Change Plan (ECP) 
been developed in the early design phase to incorporate the additional AMCM 
hydraulic system at an additional up-front cost, final purchase price and long-
term maintenance and sustainment costs could have been significantly reduced. 
With a rapidly aging MH-53E fleet, the new CH-53K would have provided the 
Navy the opportunity to consider the future purchase of about 40–45 aircraft to 
replace the existing MH-53E. Additionally, with unknown and emerging worldwide 
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threats, a multi-mission aircraft has greater international sales appeal. This case 
study could utilize cost data for the existing design plans for the CH-53K and use 
Real Options Valuation and Monte Carlo simulation to determine the long-term 
cost savings if weight and space had been reserved for future installation of the 
additional AMCM hydraulic system. A comparative study would highlight the 
reduced costs in designing for future capabilities up front as compared to 
expensive re-design and retrofit after final production has begun. 
D. FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
Modularity in a flexible and adaptable design drives innovation and 
competition, allowing the U.S. Navy to develop the world’s most sophisticated 
fleet of surface combatants. Flexible and adaptable ships allow any navy to do 
more with less through rapid reconfiguration, standard interfaces, and decoupled 
payloads. With cross-platform commonality, long-term maintenance costs are 
driven down and surface combatants can reach service-life expectancy while 
retaining combat relevancy. To achieve a flexible and adaptable fleet of surface 
combatants, the U.S. Navy needs to incorporate the theories of Real Options 
Valuation, Knowledge Value Added and Integrated Risk Management to assist in 
future design decisions. Through the use of Monte Carlo simulation and portfolio 
optimization, the U.S. Navy can begin a design process that will allow a future 
surface combatant to affordably transform over its service life, remain combat 
relevant, and stay within the targeted life cycle maintenance budget.  
This thesis highlighted two case studies where flexibility and adaptability in 
the design of a surface combatant were vital to the warship’s production and its 
ability to remain operationally relevant. The first case study highlighted the 
advantage of using modular missile payloads on LCS. Modularized weapons 
payloads prevent long and extensive yard periods when yielding new payloads, 
and this plug-and-play environment allowed LCS to continually meet the 
operational deployment cycle while technologically maturing. LPD-17 represents 
the U.S. Navy’s first attempt at a larger, more sophisticated flexible and 
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adaptable ship. Moving forward, LPD-28 can serve as the bridge for the future 
development of LX(R), ensuring the U.S. Navy designs the most technologically 
advanced and capable platform, while simultaneously reducing cost and risk. If 
done correctly, the design of LX(R) could potentially build a platform capable of 
self-defense and power projection ashore without the assistance of an escort. 
The ability to transit independent of an escort reduces the total number of ships 
in inventory, allowing future funds to be reallocated to other platforms. In 
conclusion, the U.S. Navy must adopt a new approach to ship design, moving 
away from traditional rigid design and into a realm of flexible and adaptable ships 
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